Reliable communication between parties in a network is a basic requirement for executing any protocol. In this work, we consider the e ect on reliable communication when some pairs of parties have common authentication keys. The pairs sharing keys de ne a natural \authentication graph", which may be quite di erent from the \communication graph" of the network. We characterize when reliable communication is possible in terms of these two graphs, focusing on the very strong setting of a Byzantine adversary with unlimited computational resources.
1 Introduction { 3 { key, denoted by k u;v , if and only if hu;vi 2 E A . These keys are chosen according to some known probability distribution, and every set of vertices has no information on the keys of disjoint edges (except for their a-priori probability distribution).
We consider protocols for message transmission, in which a transmitter a 2 V wants to transmit a message m to a receiver b 2 V . We assume that the system is synchronous. That is, a protocol proceeds in rounds; at the beginning of each round each party v 2 V sends messages to some of its neighbors in the graph G. These messages get to the neighbors before the beginning of the next round. The protocol speci es which messages each party sends to its neighbors in each round. The messages sent by a party v 2 V depend on a local random input held by v, the keys v holds (speci ed in G A ), the messages v got in previous rounds, and the number of the round. The messages that the transmitter sends can also depend on the message m. We assume that all parties in the system know the topology of the graphs G and G A . Furthermore, all the parties in the system know in which round party a starts to transmit a message to party b.
During the execution there might be Byzantine attacks (also known as \active attacks"). An adversary, with an unlimited power, controls a subset T of the parties. The adversary knows the protocol, the distribution under which the authentication keys where chosen, and the topology of the network (i.e., G and G A ). During an execution of the protocol, the adversary can choose T dynamically. The inclusion of a party can be done any time before, during, or after the execution of the protocol. For every party in T, the adversary knows all the messages received by that party, its random inputs, and its keys. From the moment a party is included into T, the adversary determines the messages this party sends thereafter (possibly deviating from the protocol speci cation in an arbitrary manner).
De nition 2.1 Let a; b 2 V be a transmitter and a receiver, and B be a collection of subsets of V n fa;bg. We say that a message transmission protocol is (B; )-reliable if, when the adversary can control any set in B, for every message m the probability that b accepts the message m, given that a transmitted m, is at least 1 ? , where the probability is over the random inputs of the parties, the distribution of the authentication keys, and the random input of the adversary.
If b does not accept the message transmitted by a then b might accept an incorrect message without knowing it. We say that the protocol is perfectly detecting if b never accepts an incorrect message, i.e., b either accepts the correct message or does not accept any message. A message transmission is (t; )-reliable if it is (ALL t ; )-reliable, where ALL t = fT V n fa;bg : jTj tg.
Authentication Schemes
We brie y de ne authentication schemes; the reader is referred to 12] for more details. Let K be a nite set, called the set of keys. An authentication scheme is a pair hauth; i, where { 4 { auth : f0;1g K ! f0;1g is a function, and is a probability distribution on the set of keys, K. Assume that a pair of parties, Alice and Bob, share a common key k 2 K. If
Alice wants to authenticate a message m, she computes the value = auth(m; k) and sends to Bob the message m together with . When Bob receives a pair m; , he veri es that the authentication is correct by computing the value auth(m; k) and comparing it to . If they are equal then Bob assumes that the message was transmitted by Alice. The scheme is secure if Eve, knowing hauth; i but not k, cannot generate a pair which Bob accepts. Formally, the scheme hauth; i is called an (`; )-authentication scheme if every probabilistic algorithm that sees any`pairs, hm 1 ; auth(m 1 ; k)i; hm 2 ; auth(m 2 ; k)i; : : : ; hm`;auth(m`;k)i, cannot generate, with probability greater than , a pair m; , such that m 6 = m i for every i, and = auth(m; k), where the probability is over the distribution of the authentication keys, and the random input of the probabilistic algorithm.
Connectivity
The reliability of a network is closely related to its connectivity. In this work we consider vertex connectivity of undirected graphs. A path P passes through a set T if there is a vertex u 2 T in the path. Otherwise, we say that P misses T. A set T V n fu;vg is called a (u; v)-separating set if every path between u and v passes through T. A graph G = hV;Ei is (t + 1; u; v)-connected if there is no (u; v)-separating set of size at most t. A graph G is tconnected if it is (t; u; v)-connected for every pair of vertices in the graph. Menger 10] proved that a graph G is (t; u; v)-connected if and only if hu;vi 2 E or there exists t vertex disjoint paths between u and v. Furthermore, there is an e cient algorithm that checks whether a graph is (t; u; v)-connected (for details see e.g. 7]). Notice that if there is an edge between u and v then the graph is (t; u; v)-connected for every t and there is no (u; v)-separating set.
All-Pairs Reliable Communication
In this section we characterize when reliable transmission between every pair of parties is possible. We prove that, when some pairs of parties share authentication keys, reliable transmission is possible if and only if the communication graph is (t + 1)-connected and the union of the communication and authentication graphs is (2t + 1)-connected.
Su ciency
Theorem 3.1 If the graph G is (t+1)-connected and the graph G G A is (2t+1)-connected, then for every > 0 there is an e cient protocol for (t; )-reliable message transmission between any pair of parties which uses a (1; =(2nt))-authentication scheme. Furthermore, the protocol is perfectly detecting.
We start with a subprotocol for sending messages reliably on edges in G A . { 5 { Lemma 3.2 If the graph G is (t+1)-connected then for every edge hu;vi 2 G A and for every > 0 there exists an e cient subprotocol for (t; =(2n))-reliably transmitting a message from u to v which uses a (1; =(2nt))-authentication scheme. Furthermore, this subprotocol is perfectly detecting.
Proof: The subprotocol is as follows. Vertex u authenticates the message with the key k u;v using a (1; =(2nt)) authentication scheme and sends it to v on t + 1 disjoint paths in G. If v receives an authenticated message m on any one of the t + 1 paths, and if no message other than m arrives authenticated on any other path, than v accepts m as the received message. Otherwise, v accepts nothing.
Since there are at most t Byzantine vertices, v will receive the right authenticated message on at least one path. Thus v will receive the correct message whenever v does not receive a di erent authenticated message on another path. The probability that the adversary can cause v to receive a di erent authenticated message on another path is bounded by t times the probability of the adversary forging a single authenticated message, i.e., t =(2nt) = =(2n). If v receives a di erent authenticated message on another path, then v will receive nothing, and thus the subprotocol is perfectly detecting.
We can now state the protocol for reliable message transmission. When a transmitter wants to transmit a message to a receiver, it sends the message on 2t+1 disjoint paths in the graph G G A . That is, the transmitter sends the message to the rst vertices in the paths, and each intermediate vertex propagates the messages to the next vertex on the path until it reaches the receiver. To propagate a message on an edge from G A we use the subprotocol from Lemma 3.2. If a propagation on an edge from G A fails, then no messages is propagated to the receiver on this path (at least not by honest parties). The receiver accepts a message if it is received on at least t + 1 of the 2t + 1 paths. Otherwise, the receiver accepts nothing. We complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 by proving that this protocol is reliable (Lemma 3.3) and perfectly detecting (Lemma 3.4). Proof: If the adversary has not disrupted one of the subprotocols for sending a message on an edge in G A , then the correct message is received on at least t+1 paths. Each vertex, except for the transmitter and receiver, appears at most once on each of the 2t + 1 paths. There are at most 2n edges on the union of all the paths. Thus there are at most 2n executions of the subprotocol for sending a message on an edge in G A . The probability that the adversary can disrupt at least one of these executions is bounded by 2n times the probability that the adversary can disrupt a single execution, i.e., 2n =(2n) = .
Lemma 3.4 This protocol is perfectly detecting. { 6 { Proof: The subprotocol for sending a message on an edge in G A is perfectly detecting. Thus the receiver can only receive an incorrect message on a path in G G A if there is a faulty vertex on that path, no matter how many edges in G A are on the path (and no matter how many false messages the adversary has managed to authenticate in the subprotocols). Since the paths are vertex disjoint, the receiver can receive an incorrect message on at most t of the paths, and so will never accept an incorrect message.
Necessity
The next theorem states that if the su cient condition does not hold then reliable message transmission is not possible, i.e. it is also a necessary condition. The result does not assume how the common keys are used. That is, even if the keys in G A are used for purposes other than authentication (e.g., for encryption) then reliable message transmission is not possible. Furthermore, the result does not assume any limit on the size of the keys. execution i is to send no messages whatsoever to A T i , and to send to B exactly the same messages that are sent to B by the (honest) T i in execution i.
In order for the Byzantine T i to behave as speci ed in execution i, the adversary needs to simulate the behavior of A T i for execution i. We show how this can be done. The adversary simulates, round by round, the behavior of the vertices in A T i for execution i, using as the authentication keys for pairs of parties in A T. At the beginning of each round, each simulated party has a history of messages that it got in the simulation of the previous rounds, its simulated local random input, and its simulated keys. The simulated party sends during the simulation the same messages that the honest party would send in the original protocol in the same state. The simulated messages that T i sends to B are really sent by the parties. All other messages are used only to update the history for the next round. The messages which are added to the history of each simulated vertex are the real messages that are sent by the parties in B and the simulated messages that are sent by the vertices in A T i . No messages from T i are added to the history. These two executions are described in Fig. 2 .
The history of messages of each simulated vertex in execution i is the same as the history of the vertex in execution i. Therefore, the messages sent by T 0 and T 1 to members of B in both executions are exactly the same. Thus the parties in B cannot distinguish whether the set T 0 is Byzantine and the message transmitted by a is m 0 , or the set T 1 is Byzantine and the message transmitted by a is m 1 . Since b 2 B, the receiver b cannot distinguish these cases either. execution it errs in the second. Thus, in any strategy by b for choosing whether to receive m 0 or m 1 there is some i such that when m i is transmitted, the receiver accepts m i with probability at most 1=2. Consider the following adversary. The adversary chooses T i as the Byzantine set, chooses the random local inputs for the parties in A T 0 , and chooses keys for pairs of parties in A T according to the same distribution that the real keys are distributed. (The adversary does not try to guess the actual keys and random inputs that parties in A T have, but only chooses them from the same distribution which they are chosen in the real execution.) The adversary simulates the parties in A with m i , the keys and the local random inputs it chose. When a transmits the message m i , the receiver b errs with probability at least half. Thus, if G G A is not (2t + 1)-connected then every scheme has reliability of at least 1=2.
Single-Pair Fault-Restricted Communication
We now prove a characterization of single-pair fault-restricted reliable communication. That is, the sender a transmits a message to the receiver b when one of two given sets T 0 ; T 1 is guaranteed to contain all of the faulty processors. The proof of su ciency is constructive, i.e., we present a protocol that achieves reliable communication whenever it is possible.
Ideas of the Protocol
In this section we informally present the ideas of the protocol, and try to motivate the de nition of a graph G which is used in the characterization. We sketch a series of protocols, relying on increasingly weaker assumptions, and ending with our actual protocol. For simplicity, let us assume that the adversary can never authenticate false messages unless it holds the authentication key (ignoring for the moment the negligible probability that this assumption is violated). Failure of the First Protocol: Consider Graph 1 in Fig. 3 . The First Protocol fails for this graph, because a and b do not share an authentication key. However, we can succeed for this example as follows. Suppose a authenticates m with k a;w and sends it to w through T 1 . If w receives a message with the proper authentication, then w authenticates it with k w;b and sends it to b through T 1 ; otherwise w sends nothing. If T 1 changes or removes an authenticated message during the protocol, then we say that T 1 has \disabled" the corresponding authentication edge. Either b will receive a properly authenticated message along this \path," and will accept it, or b will know that T 1 has disabled at least one authentication edge. Whenever b knows that T 1 is at fault, b accepts whatever was received along the path through T 0 . This is the intuition behind our Second Protocol. path that misses T 1 , while G 0 contains a path that misses both T 0 and T 1 . The transmitter \sends" the message to the receiver on both paths. To \send" over an authentication edge means to authenticate with the corresponding key and send on a path in G that misses T 0 . The existence of such a path is guaranteed by the de nition of G 0 . At the end of the execution of the protocol, if the receiver has gotten a message on the path in G 0 that misses both T 0 and T 1 , then this message is accepted. Otherwise, the receiver accepts the message sent along the path in G that misses T 1 .
To summarize, the idea of this protocol is to get information on the Byzantine set from the fact that a message was not received on a certain path. Either the Byzantine set does not disable an edge and the receiver learns the message, or the Byzantine set does disable an edge and the receiver learns which set is Byzantine.
Failure of the Second Protocol: Consider Graph 2 in Fig. 3 . The Second Protocol fails for this graph, because there is no path in G 0 that misses both T 0 and T 1 . However, we can succeed for this example as follows. The message is sent along the two simple paths from a to b in G, one through T 0 and one through T 1 . In addition, the message is sent along the \authentication path" through u, v, and w. This authentication path will either deliver the correct message, or it will expose the Byzantine set and allow b to choose between the messages received along the simple paths. For the rst hop of the authentication path, a authenticates the message with k a;u and sends it to u through T 0 . Either u receives a properly authenticated message, or u learns that T 0 is Byzantine. (Note that u will know when an expected message does not arrive, because we are assuming a synchronous system in which all parties know when the protocol has started.) Now the edge hu;vi is traversed, using the key k u;v to deliver some authenticated message from u to v through T 0 . This message will either be the same message that u received or the new message \T 0 is Byzantine" depending on what u learned. The remaining hops of the authentication path proceed similarly. Eventually, b will either receive a properly authenticated message under k w;b from w through T 1 or b will know that T 1 is Byzantine. If b receives a properly authenticated message, then that message will either be the correct message from a or it will expose the Byzantine set.
Third Protocol: Consider the graph G 00 obtained from G G A by removing all authentication edges hu;vi such that each of T 0 and T 1 is a (u; v)-separating set in G. Suppose that G contains a path that misses T 0 and a path that misses T 1 , while G 00 contains a path that misses both T 0 and T 1 . The transmitter \sends" the message to b on all three paths. To \send" along an edge hu;vi 2 G A , the vertex u sends the authenticated message hm;auth(m;k u;v )i on a path in G that either misses T 0 or misses T 1 . Such a path exists by the de nition of G 00 , and we can assume that all parties including b know what this path is. If v does not receive a properly authenticated message, then v sends an alert message \v { 11 { has not received a message from u" to b. This alert message is propagated to b along the path in G 00 in the same manner as the regular message. Eventually, either b will receive the correct message on the path in G 00 , or the Byzantine set will disable at least one edge and b will receive an appropriate alert message. From this information, b will know which message to accept from the simple paths in G.
Failure of the Third Protocol: Consider Graph 3 in Fig. 3 . The Third Protocol fails for this graph, because the edge hu;wi does not get included in G 00 . That is, both T 0 and T 1 disconnect u and w in G. However, T 1 does not disconnect u and w if we are allowed to use hb;wi. By the previous analysis, we ought to be allowed to use hb;wi, since it cannot be disabled without implicating T 1 .
Final Protocol: The additional idea in this protocol is that if every T i that can disable an edge is caught, then this edge can be considered as a reliable edge. That is, when checking if another authentication edge is reliable we use the edges of G as well as those authentication edges which we already established as reliable. This motivates the recursive de nition of G in the next section.
Characterization of Single-Pair Fault-Restricted Communication
The intuition behind the de nition of the graph G is that it contains all the edges that cannot be disabled without b learning which set disabled them. We formally de ne G , and from G the notion of a \confusing pair":
De nition 4.1 Let a; b 2 V be the transmitter and receiver, and T 0 ; T 1 V n fa;bg be a pair of sets. If E k+1 = E k then G = hV;E i = hV;E E k i.
{ 12 {
The graph G depends upon a, b, T 0 and T 1 . We use the notation G a;b when a and b are not clear (T 0 and T 1 will be clear throughout the paper). For example, consider Graph 3 described in Fig. 3 . We rst add the edge hw;bi since T 0 is not a separating set in G. Now, the set T 1 is not a (u; w)-separating set in the current graph and therefore hu;wi is added, and nally ha;ui is added. Thus, the Final protocol succeeds in this graph. De nition 4.2 Let The protocol for proving Theorem 4.4 is described in Section 4.3, and the protocol is analyzed in Section 4.4. The proof of Theorem 4.4 is given in Section 4.5. We rst discuss the properties of G . For every G and G A it can be shown that E k+1 = E k for every k n. Lemma 4.5 E k = E n for every k n and for every G and G A . Proof: Denote B i as the set of vertices in the connected component of b in hV n(T 0 T 1 ); E E i i. If B i = B i?1 then E k = E i for every k i (since hu;vi 2 E A is added to E k if and only if there exists a path in G, which misses some T i , from u to some w 2 B k?1 ). Since B i V , the size of B i can increase at most n ? 1 times and the lemma follows.
One might think that if a can transmit a message to b then b can transmit a message to a. However, the de nition of G is not symmetric with respect to a and b, and in Fig. 4 we show a graph in which a can transmit a message to b but b cannot transmit a message to a.
Protocol for Proving Su ciency
First we present Protocol SEND, described in Fig. 5 , which sends a message along a path in G . In this protocol either v accepts the message sent by u or the receiver b learns which set is Byzantine. For this protocol we need the following notation. The level of an edge hu;vi 2 G is the minimum j such that hu;vi 2 E j . If hu;vi 2 E then its level is 0. The level of a path is the maximum level of an edge on the path. For every hu;vi 2 E j nE we x a simple path between u and v in G , denoted by path(u; v), such that the level of the path (1) is part of the propagation of the message on P and is called an internal call. The call at line (3) informs the receiver b whether v i+1 has accepted a message, and is called an alert call. The alert call can be executed in parallel to the rest of the protocol.
In Fig. 6 we describe Protocol TRANSMIT in which a transmits a message to b.
Proof of Su ciency
We rst establish that the execution of SEND(m; path(u; v); Destb) always terminates, although it might take as many as n n rounds. v i+1 ; v i ) ) after at most n j rounds, and the message is propagated to b after at n j additional rounds. We conclude that all messages sent in the execution of path(u; v) (caused by internal and alert recursive calls) are performed at most O(n j+1 ) rounds after the execution has started. By Lemma 4.6, this quantity is bounded by 2 O(n log n) .
We next prove that in the execution of Protocol SEND either the correct message is accepted, or b can identify the Byzantine set. Intuitively, if b has not received the message on path(v; b) then there was at least one authentication edge hu;vi that was disabled.
Consider the rst such edge. Then b should receive a message saying that \v has not accepted a message from u". From all previous edges b should receive a message saying that the message was received. The receiver b know that path(u; v) misses T i , and thus T i must be Byzantine. Assume that all alert messages that b received are of the type \v has accepted a message from u". Then no authentication edge was disabled during the recursive calls and the only authentication edges that were disabled are on path(v; b). In this case the message that b receives on path(v; b) is \v i+1 has not accepted a message from v i " for some v i ; v i+1 on path(v; b), and this message can be trusted. There is only one set that hits path(v i ; v i+1 ) and b learns that this set must be Byzantine. Otherwise, let hv i ; v i+1 i be the rst edge for which b receives an alert message claiming that \v i+1 has not accepted a message from v i ". No edge used in the recursive call during the execution of SEND(m; path(v i ; v i+1 ); FALSE) was disabled, and the edge hv i ; v i+1 i was disabled by a vertex on path(v i ; v i+1 ) which did not propagate the message it got. Again, there is only one set that hits path(v i ; v i+1 ) and b learns that this set must be Byzantine.
We are ready to prove the su cient condition:
Proof: (Theorem 4. 3) The protocol described in Fig. 6 su ces. First notice that by Definition 4.2 the paths P 0 ; P 1 and path(a; b) exist. By Lemma 4.7, if the adversary has not authenticated a false message, b receives the message transmitted by a. Let`be the maximum number of times that any single authentication key is used, and let k be the total number of times that all of the authentication keys are used; by Lemma 4.6 both of these values are well-de ned. Then, using an (`; =k)-authentication scheme will ensure that the probability that the adversary has authenticated a false message is at most .
Proof of Necessity
We next prove the necessary condition, that is, if hT 0 ; T 1 i is a confusing pair in G then reliable transmission is not possible.
Proof: (Theorem 4.4) If T 0 or T 1 is an (a; b)-separating set in G then when they crash-fail no message transmission is possible. Otherwise, the proof is a generalization of the proof of Theorem 3.7. We only describe the modi cations to that proof. Unlike the proof of Theorem 3.7, T 0 T 1 is not a separating set in G G A but rather in G . That is, we have to deal with the edges that we deleted from G . The sets A and B are de ned with respect to G . The strategy for the adversary is de ned as in the proof of Theorem 3.7. There are two problems. The rst problem is that T 0 and T 1 can intersect. Therefore, during the simulation and the protocol the parties in T 0 \ T 1 do not send any messages. The second problem is that while simulating the parties in A, the adversary does not know the keys of edges hu;vi 2 E A , where u 2 A and v 2 B. This seems to be a problem, since the parties in B know these keys and can distinguish if di erent keys are used during the simulation.
However, T 0 T 1 is a (a; b)-separating set in G , and any edge hu;vi 2 E A between A and B is an authentication edge such that for every w 2 B both T 0 and T 1 are a (u; w)-separating { 16 { set in G (since hu;vi 2 E A nE ). Therefore, both sets will disable this edge, and the vertices in B might know that the correct key k u;v is not used, but will not be able to know which set to blame.
More formally, de ne a set C A, where u 2 C if for every v 2 B both T 0 and T 1 are a (u; v)-separating set in G. Consider an execution of a protocol, where the adversary sends messages according to the strategy de ned in the proof of Theorem 3.7. We claim that the messages that are sent by parties in C do not in uence B. If u 2 C can in uence a party v 2 B, there must be a path u; w 1 ; : : :; w j?1 ; w j = v in G such that u sends a message to w 1 , then w 1 sends a message to w 2 that depends on the message that it got from u and so on until a message gets to v. This path must pass through T i (the Byzantine set). Let w j be the rst vertex from T i on the path (i.e., u; w 1 ; : : :; w j?1 2 A T i ). According to the strategy of the adversary, w j ignores the messages that it gets from parties in A T i , and thus the messages that it sends do not depend on the message sent by u. Similarly, the messages sent by u 2 C when T i simulates the parties in A do not in uence the messages it sends to B, since the path from u to a vertex in B passes through at least one vertex in T i . No messages are sent by parties in T i during the simulation, and so the simulated messages received by parties in T i in uence neither the parties in A T i nor the parties in B, and can be ignored. Therefore, the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.7 complete the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Single-Pair Reliable Communication
In this section we consider (t; )-reliable transmission between a given pair of parties a and b. We rst show that if there is a fault restricted protocol for every pair of sets of size t then there is a protocol that is reliable against every set of size at most t. 
Privacy from Reliability
In this section we consider private and reliable communication, i.e., transmission in which the adversary should not learn any information about the transmitted message. For this, we have to assume that the reliable channels are private: the adversary has no information on the messages sent on the channel hu;vi unless it controls u or v. We present a general protocol for private and reliable transmission that succeeds if G is (t + 1; a; b)-connected and reliable communication is possible. This protocol is also presented in 9]. We use this protocol to show that for both all-pairs and single-pair, the su ciency condition for reliable communication from a to b and from b to a is a su cient condition for reliable communication with privacy.
We formally de ne private transmission. In the following de nition C T denotes the communication received by a set T during an execution of the protocol. This communication is a function of the transmitted message, the random inputs of the vertices, and the authentication keys. If T is Byzantine then C T also depends on the strategy of the adversary. Informally, a protocol is perfectly private if the probably distribution of C T is independent of the message. The protocol is -private if for every two messages m 0 ; m 1 , the distance between the probability distribution of C T (m 0 ) and C T (m 1 ) is at most . Formally, De nition 6.1 A message transmission protocol is -private against a set T if for every strategy of the Byzantine set T and every two messages m 0 ; m 1 the set T cannot distinguish which message was sent as follows: for every set of keys fk u;v : hu;vi 2 E A ; u 2 Tg, every two set of random inputs fr u : u 2 Tg it holds that (1)
The probabilities are taken over the random keys of the parties in V nT and the keys of pairs of parties in V nT, and the sum is over all possible values of the communication. A message transmission protocol is (t; )-private if it is -private against every set of size at most t. A protocol is perfectly t-private if it is (t; 0)-private.
We do not consider the setting of privacy without reliability, since that condition could be met by a protocol without any messages. We next present the outline of the protocol for private message transmission. The exact protocol is described in Fig. 6 . The protocol uses the fact that there are t+1 disjoint paths from a to b, and that a and b can communicate reliably without privacy. In the rst step of the protocol The transmitter a sends a di erent random one-time pad on each of the t+1 paths to b . Using reliable non-private communication, and a randomized authentication procedure, a and b determine which pads have been received correctly by b (Steps (3)-(5) of the protocol). The transmitter a then encrypts the message using the sum of the pads that pass the test, and sends this encryption to b reliably and non-privately. We use universal hashing 2, 13] for the randomized authentication procedure, and perform all arithmetic in a large nite eld F.
We rst argue that this protocol is reliable with high probability. We argue that the protocol is private with high probability. Lemma 6.3 Assume that each reliable non-private transmission is (t; =3)-reliable. Then, Protocol PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION is (t; 2 =3)-private. Furthermore, if each reliable nonprivate transmission is perfectly detecting then the protocol is perfectly t-private.
Proof: The adversary's only source of information about m a is z a . It su ces to show that the adversary has no information about c a j for some j 2 G a . There exists a path j with no faults on it, i.e., c a j ; d a j = c b j ; d b j . If the reliable non-private transmission from b to a succeeds, then j 2 G a . The adversary's only source of information about c a j is r a j ; s a j , from which all possible values of c a j are equally likely. Notice that privacy may be threatened when the reliable non-private transmission from b to a fails. A partial disruption of this transmission (while otherwise following the protocol honestly) could cause G a to contain only paths on which there is a fault. This could allow the adversary to learn c a j for every j 2 G a , and hence determine m a from z a . However, if the reliable transmission protocol is perfectly detecting then Protocol PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION is perfectly private.
Thus, Theorem 3.1 implies the following:
{ 19 { Theorem 6.4 Let G be a graph describing a network of reliable and private channels. If the graph G is (t+1)-connected and the graph G G A is (2t+1)-connected, then for every > 0 there is an e cient protocol for (t; )-reliable and perfectly t-private message transmission between any pair of parties which uses a (2; =(6nt))-authentication scheme. OTHERWISE, b learns that T i is Byzantine for some i 2 f0;1g.
b accepts the message received on P i . 
